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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/respondent, : 
Case No. 860431 
v. 
Priority No. 2 
HARRY F. SUNIVILLE, : 
Defendant/appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of the offense of 
Aggravated Robbery, a Felony in the First Degree, in violation 
of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, 
Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant, Harry F. Suniville, was charged by the 
State of Utah with the crime of Aggravated Robbery, a First 
Degree Felony, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 
302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. The substance of 
this charge was that on or about the 28th day of February, 
1986, appellant unlawfully and intentionally took personal 
property from the possession of Suzette Anderson, who was 
working as a teller for the Mountain America Credit Union, 
which is located at 7050 South Union Park Avenue. Appellant 
was convicted as charged in the Information. Appellant sub-
sequently filed a motion in arrest of judgment, which motion 
was denied. Appellant was sentencted to the Utah State Prison 
for am indeterminate period of five years to life, with the 
commitment issuing forthwith. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order remanding the case for new 
trial as a Second Degree Felony, or in the alternative, dismissal 
of the case. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court commit error in denying 
appellant's motion to direct a verdict of not guilty of aggravated 
robbery, or, in the alternative, to reduce to simple robbery at 
the end of the case presented by the State? 
2. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury as to 
the definition of "facsimile of a firearm"? 
3. Did the trial court error in failing to instruct 
the jury regarding eyewitness identification and the particular 
problems involved with eyewitness identification? 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 28th, 1986, Suzette Anderson, while 
working as a teller with Mountain America Credit Union, located 
in Salt Lake County, was approached by a male wearing a ski 
mask. The suspect's right hand was in the pocket of the over-
coat he was wearing. (R. 140) According to her testimony, the 
suspect kept his hand in the pocket and put it over the counter 
"like he had a gun". (R. 140) The suspect then said that he 
was intending to rob her and asked for "big bills"* (R. 141) 
During the course of the robbery, the suspect never took his 
right hand from his pocket, nor did he ever display a weapon or 
a facsimile of a weapon. (R. 152-153) Ms. Anderson was unable 
to identify the suspect. (R. 156) 
Upon exiting the credit union, the suspect encountered 
a number of individuals who were able to describe him in more 
detail, since he removed the ski mask that had protected his 
identity as soon as he walked out the credit union. At that 
time, Dan Parker was sitting outside the credit union eating 
his lunch. He saw the suspect exit the credit union doors with 
a ski mask on and watched him take it off. (R. 167) He further 
described the person as having one hand in his pocket. Mr. 
Parker then pursued the suspect and chased him through the 
parking lot. The suspect never displayed a gun nor a facsimile 
thereof. Mr. Parker subsequently was shown photo arrays which 
included photos of appellant and identified him as the person 
he saw leaving the Credit Union. Parker made that same iden-
tification in court during the course of the trial. (R. 169) 
Jeffery Randall Hill also testified that he saw a 
person matching the general description of the person who had 
just robbed the credit union, leaving the vicinity with a 
stocking wadded up in one hand. (R. 204) Mr. Hill had occasion 
to observe the suspect fleeing the scene, was able to see both 
of his hands, and observed the left hand to contain a stocking 
and the right hand to be clenched. (R. 216) Subsequently, 
Mr. Hill was shown photo arrays by the police detectives and 
identified appellant, in court, as the person he saw fleeing 
the credit union. 
Harry Barker, a construction worker, was also in the 
vicinity of the Credit Union and had occasion to see the suspect 
leaving the Credit Union immediately after the robbery. In 
court, he identified appellant as the person he saw leaving the 
credit union. Mr. Barker testified that he saw something in 
the suspect's right hand, but was unable to say that it was a 
gun. (R. 231-232) Mr. Barker also purported to identify 
appellant as the person he saw at the location after having 
reviewed photos shown to him by police officers. 
Nick Dubois testified for the prosecution. He was 
also working in the area at the time the robbery occurred and 
observed the suspect leaving the scene in a brown Camaro. 
Debois subsequently made an identification of a Camaro parked 
at the residence where appellant lived. Debois neither identi-
fied appellant nor placed a weapon or facsimile of a weapon in 
the hands of the suspect who left the credit union. Detective 
Glover, who investigated the case, testified that he searched 
both appellant's home and his car and found no items that 
appeared to be related to the credit union robbery, (R. 269) 
and specifically said that no gun was ever found. (R. 268) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant contends that there is no evidence that 
the robber in the instant case was armed either with a firearm 
or a facsimile of a firearm and that, at best, the offense 
committed was Robbery, a second degree felony, pursuant to 
Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 301, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, which carries a penalty of not less than one nor more 
than fifteen years. 
Appellant also contends that the jury was incorrectly 
instructed as to the meaning of the word facsimile as it applied 
to the aggravated robbery statute. 
Finally appellant submits that the trial court's re-
fusal to give a so-called "Telfaire instruction" constituted 
reversible error because it unduly prejudiced appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT A WEAPON OR A 
FACSIMILE OF A WEAPON WAS USED IN THE 
ROBBERY. 
Of the several witnesses who testified with relation to 
the robbery of the credit union, none were able to place a gun 
in the hand of the suspect. Suzette Anderson testified that 
during the course of the robbery, the suspect kept his right 
hand in his coat pocket and held that hand up in a threaten-
ing manner. The witnesses who saw the suspect flee described 
him as having both hands out of his pocket, holding the stocking 
that had covered his face in his left hand. Only one witness 
described him as having anything in his other hand. That 
witness, Harry Barker, was unable to say that the item, whatever 
it was, was a firearm or a facsimile thereof. (R. 231-232) 
When asked about the gun Suzette Anderson stated: 
0. He never told you he had a gun did he? 
A. No. 
0. Never showed you his gun? 
A. No. 
(R. 152) 
Mr. Parker, who had adequate opportunity to watch the 
entirety of the flight of the robber never saw a weapon or 
facsimile thereof. (R. 177) 
This court has previously considered the "facsimile 
of a firearm" language of §76-6-302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, in State v. Turner, Utah, 572 P.2d 387 (1977). In 
that case, the defendant was charged with the crime of aggravated 
robbery and the witness, who was the victim in the case, said 
that he observed "one to two inches of a gun barrel" protruding 
from underneath the defendant's shirt during the robbery. 
(Citation supra, at p. 388) The trial court in that case gave 
two instructions related to the issue of facsimile. Instruction 
Number 11 stated: 
You are instructed that a facsimile is 
defined as: an exact and precise copy of 
anything. An exact reproduction, for 
example, the signature reproduced by a 
rubber stamp. 
Also, Instruction Number 12 said: 
You are further instructed that a facsimile 
of a firearm is an instrument that by its 
appearance resembles a firearm. 
This court, on appeal, held: 
We find the court's Instruction Number 12 
to be a 'sensible interpretation' of the 
statutory language.,. . We do not perceive 
sufficient tension between the definitions 
of 'facsimile' in Instruction Numbers 11 and 
12 to constitute effective vagueness." 
The conviction against Turner was affirmed. 
The arguments made in the form of a motion to dismiss 
at the end of the state's case are instructive in considering 
the issue raised on appeal in the instant case. After the 
prosecution had rested, counsel for appellant raised a motion 
to dismiss or in the alternative a motion to reduce to robbery, 
a second degree felony. Counsel argued that there was no evidence 
a weapon or a facsimile thereof had been used in the robbery. 
(R. 286) The prosecutor, while admitting that there was no 
evidence a facsimile had been used, argued instead that the 
test should be a subjective one, stating: 
Our Court days the sensible interpretation 
is that any instrument, by its appearance 
resembles a firearm, that is a facsimile. 
That is what we have here. Perception by 
the teller that it is a firearm. I submit 
there is sufficient evidence to show that 
the defendant, the perpetrator, intended 
the victim perceive that as a firearm. (R. 
249) 
This argument was apparently adopted by the court in 
making the rulings: 
It is the court's belief in the interpretation 
of the statute involved and in the light of 
State v. Turner, when one uses any object 
with the intent to make the victim believe 
there is a gun and the victim reasonably 
could believe there is a gun that whatever 
object is being used is, in fact, a facsimile 
of a firearm whether it is a piece of pipe 
in the pocket or a plastic gun or even a 
finger, if it is perceived by the victim as 
being a gun and is intended by the perpetra-
tor to be a gun or to at least make the 
victim think it is a gun, I believe we have 
the elements necessary to meet the require-
ments of aggravated armed robbery. Based 
upon that, I am going to deny your motion 
to dismiss or reduce. (R. 296) 
This adoption of a "subjective standard" is not mandated by 
Turner, supra. 
The issue was broached by both counsel in closing 
arguments. Counsel for the state argued that while no gun was 
ever found, the appropriate test was whether the victim thought 
it was a gun, to which counsel for appellant interposed an 
objection. (R. 326) Counsel for the state was allowed to 
continue arguing that the subjective perception by the victim 
that a weapon was used was sufficient to prove that a facsimile 
of a weapon has been used. (R. 326) Following the prosecutor's 
rebuttal argument, counsel for appellant moved for a mistrial 
based on the prosecutor's argument relating to the subjective 
issue of whether it was a facsimile or not, which motion was 
denied. (R. 362) 
The record currently before the court in the instant 
case differs in two important particulars from Turner. First, 
in Turner the witness/victim identified "one or two inches of 
gun barrel". Turner presents a factual question to the jurors, 
which is "was the witness correct in his perception that he saw 
a gun barrel?". This case presents no such issue since no gun 
or portion of a gun was ever seen by anyone. In fact, there is 
every reason to believe that no gun was used, since when the 
suspect fled the Credit Union and was pursued, he did not 
produce a weapon with which to defend himself from his pursuers. 
The second difference is that the Turner court approved two 
instructions, which taken in combination, would not mislead the 
jury there or in the instant case. However, to define a facsimile 
as "any item or thing that in its appearance resembles a firearm" 
without further clarification, is to lead to the kind a vague 
and constitutionally imprecise instruction that possibly caused 
the jury to convict on an aggravated robbery where there was no 
evidence of a gun or any facsimile thereof. 
The court in Turner quoted Websters New Unabridged 
Dictionary, 2nd Edition, which defines "facsimile" as "1. act 
of making copy, imitation". That definition has not changed in 
the current edition of that dictionary. Black's Law Dictionary, 
Revised 4th Edition, defines "facsimile" as "an exact copy, 
preserving all the marks of the original", which language was 
requested by the defendant in the defendant's requested jury 
instruction. The New American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language defines "facsimile" as "1. an exact copy or 
reproduction as of a document", or "2. exactly reproduced; 
duplicate". 
The issue that presents itself here is whether there 
was sufficient evidence of a "facsimile of a weapon" to allow 
the matter to be decided by the jury. It is appellant's conten-
tion that since there was no evidence of a weapon, that no 
witness ever saw a weapon of facsimile thereof, and none was 
recovered after the robbery, the court erred in submitting the 
matter to the jury as a first degree felony, Aggravated 
Robbery, 
While the suspect made threats consistent with his 
having a weapon, and kept one hand in his pocket as if there might 
be something in that pocket, no evidence was presented at trial to 
the existence of an actual weapon or a facsimile thereof either 
at the scene of the crime or subsequently in appellant's house, 
vehicle, or about his person. Therefore, the trial court erred 
in denying appellant's motion at the end of the State's case 
to either dismiss the aggravated robbery or reduce it to simple 
robbery and the case against appellant should be remanded for 
trial as a robbery under §76-6-301, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON THE PROPER DEFINITION OF 
"FACSIMILE". 
As stated in the argument above in Turner, supra the 
court approved two instructions, Instruction No. 11 which 
states: 
You are instructed that a facsimile is 
defined as: an exact and precise copy of 
anything. An exact reproduction, for 
example, the signature reproduced by a 
rubber stamp. 
Also, Instruction Number 12 said: 
You are further instructed that a facsimile 
of a firearm is an instrument that by its 
appearance resembles a firearm. 
Counsel for appellant in the instant case request-
ed an instruction which encompassed the language included in 
Instruction Number 11 of Turner, supra (defendant's requested 
Instruction Number 6, paragraph 2, R. 356). Counsel for the 
State requested an instruction which was similar to the Intruc-
tion Number 12 in Turner, supra, which defined "facsimileM as 
follows: 
A facsimile of a firearm is any item or 
thing that by its apearance resembles a 
firearm. 
The court gave the prosecutions instruction as Instruction 
Number 18 (R. 72), but declined to give defense counsels requested 
Instruction Number 6 (R. 56). Hence, the only instruction 
given to the jury as a purported aid in determining whether a 
facsimile of a weapon was used is the definition of "fac-
simile" . 
While appellant in Turner, supra, may not have been 
unduly prejudiced by the giving of the two instructions which, in 
combination, purported to define facsimile of a weapon, the 
deletion of one-half of the information contained in those two 
instructions as the trial court did in the instant case was 
excessively vague. The giving of the single instruction failed 
to provide adequate information to the jury whereas the combina-
tion of the two instructions was able to pass constitutional 
muster in Turner. 
The sole instruction given to the jury in the instant 
case with regard to the definition of facsimile is: 
A facsimile of a firearm is any item or 
thing that by its appearance resembles a 
firearm. 
This simple instruction is unconstitutionally vague and would 
not have been helpful to a jury in considering the issue. In 
addition, taken in the absence of the other instructions in 
Turner which defined the word facsimile, the jury was left to 
speculate as to what a "facsimile" was or would be under the 
circumstances presented by the State in the instant case. 
Wherefore appellant asks that the court remand the 
case for trial with the appropriate instructions as to "facsimile 
of a weapon". 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY IN-
STRUCT THE JURY REGARDING EYEWITNESS IDEN-
TIFICATION AND THE PARTICULAR PROBLEMS 
ASSOCIATED WITH EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICA-
TION. 
While several witnesses from the Credit Union described 
the clothing the suspect was wearing, no one from inside the 
bank purported to make an identification of appellant or any 
other person. However, several people from the vicinity of the 
parking lot outside the Credit Union described the fleeing 
suspect and purported to identify appellant during the course 
of the trial. 
Suzette Anderson could not make an identification, 
but did describe the suspect's gait as being "very similar". 
(R. 143) She also indicated that the suspect was wearing a 
gold/yellow coat that was very long. (R. 150) Ms. Anderson 
described the suspect as being 180 to 200 pounds and 6' tall. 
The State next called Dan Parker to the witness stand. 
Mr. Parker identified appellant as the person he saw leaving 
the credit union. (R. 169) He described him as being 6' 
tall and 140 pounds with brown hair. (R. 181) Mr. Parker 
described the person as wearing a "mountaineer" type of coat of 
gold color (R. 166f 167) , which extended to the crotch level. (R. 
176) The State next called Jeffery Randall Hill to the witness 
stand. Mr. Hill was outside the Credit Union immediately 
following the robbery. Mr. Hill described the person who he 
saw as having brown hair, 5'10" or 5'11" and "wearing a heavy 
coat all puffed up". (R. 203) Mr. Hill was not sure of the 
color of that jacket. Mr. Hill purported to make an in court 
identification of appellant as being the person he saw on that 
occasion, but described the color of the coat as being a greenish-
brown or khaki color. (R. 216) 
Harry Barker, who was also outside the Credit Union, 
identified appellant in the courtroom as the robber. Barker 
described the parka as being gathered at the waist and being 
tan in color. (R. 230) Barker described the suspect as being 
6' tall, 160-170 pounds. (R. 232) 
The State then called Nick Dubois who was unable to 
identify the suspect, but saw the vehicle in which the suspect 
left, which he described as a "chocolate brown Camaro between 
the year 1970 to 1975". (R. 243) The witness was then told to 
visit the neighborhood of 2235 Dallin wherein he subsequently 
made an identification of a vehicle which was identified as 
being registered to appellant. 
Appellant's counsel requested a so-called "Telfaire" 
instruction, the substance of which was to advise the jury as 
to the potential difficulties of eye-witness identification. 
Said instruction was refused by the court and the court fs 
instruction included no particular reference to possible dif-
ficulties with eye-witness identification. (R. 55) The type 
of instruction requested by defense counsel has had numerous 
occasions to be reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court following 
the case of United States v. Telfaire, 469 P.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 
1972). This court held, in State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah 
1985); State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Newton, 681 P.2d 833 (Utah 1984); State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 
56 (Utah 1982); and State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185 (Utah 
1981) that the giving of such an instruction was to be left 
largely to the discretion of the trial court. However, with 
the passage of time, it became clear to the court that the 
requested cautionary instructions as to eye-witness identifica-
tion were not being routinely given by the trial courts. In 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) this court cited at 
length the various difficulties and errors that arise in the 
process of eye-witness identification and the scholarly studies 
that have been done to point out the difficulties inherent in 
witness identification. Long, supra, p. 488-491. The court 
held: 
We are convinced that, at a minimum, addi-
tional judicial guidance to the jury in 
evaluating such testimony is warranted. We 
therefore today abandon our discretionary 
approach to cautionary jury instructions 
and direct that in cases tried from this 
day forward, trial courts shall give such an 
instruction whenever eye-witness identifica-
tion is a central issue in a case and 
such an instruction is requested by the 
defense. Given the great weight jurors are 
likely to give eye-witness testimony, and 
the deep and generally unperceived flaws in 
it, to convict the defendant on such evidence 
without advising the jury of the factors 
that should be consider in evaluating it 
could well deny the defendant due process 
of law under article I, section 7, of the 
Utah Constitution. IQ. at page 492. 
It is quite clear that eye-witness identification was 
"a central issue" in the instant case and counsel for appellant 
requested an instruction which comported in substance with the 
type of jury instruction that this court mandated in Long. 
(R. 55) However, appellant's trial occurred on the 10th and 
11th day of June, 1986, and the opinion in Long, supra, which, 
by its terms, was to be applied "in cases tried from this date 
forward", was filed on June 20th, 1986. When Long, supra, was 
filed no judgment had been entered against appellant, with 
sentencing having been set for July 7th, 1986, and judgment 
against was not entered until July 7th, 1986. (R. 106) 
After becoming aware of the ruling in Long, supra, 
defense counsel filed a motion in arrest of judgment based on 
the ruling of the case (R. 104), which motion was denied by the 
court on July 7th, 1986, (R. 106). Whereupon appellant was 
sentenced to prison. In other words, had appellant's trial 
occurred one week later, he would have been entitled, pursuant 
to Long, supra, to an instruction which informed the jury as to 
some of the difficulties which occur in eye-witness identifica-
tion. To have the substantial rights of defendants turn on 
such arbitrary dates is to give the appearance of arbitrariness 
on the part of the justice system and ought to be avoided, 
particularly since judgment against appellant had not been 
entered at the time Long was decided. 
Even absent the ruling in Long it is appellant's 
contention he should have been entitled to a reversal since the 
court's refusal to give the appropriate "Telfaire" instruction 
was in violation of the court's discretion granted prior to the 
ruling in Long. Since Long, supra, this court has ruled in 
State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378, where the court continued to 
examine discretionary action of the trial court in those pre-Long 
cases involving the refusal of the court to give a cautionary 
instruction. As the court stated in Jonas; 
Trial of the present case preceded Long, 
and therefore defendant's claim must be 
evaluated under the prior case law to 
determine whether the trial court abused 
it's discretion in refusing to give the 
cautionary instruction. Ld. 1380. 
At the outset, it ought to be noted that Jonas, supra, 
is different than the instant case in that judgment in that 
case was final at the time that Long, supra, was decided. In 
Jonas, supra, the court reversed appellant's conviction, holding 
that "the trial court abused its discretion in not giving a 
cautionary instruction about the weaknesses inherent in eye-
witness identification" at 1381. Counsel for appellant submits 
that the same treatment ought to be accorded appellant in this 
case. While Jonas represents a single eye-witness case and the 
instant appeal represents a multiple eye-witness identification, 
the difficulties inherent in eye-witness identification still 
exist here. 
The wide disparity of descriptions, in height and 
weight as well as the description of the suspects clothing, 
demonstrate that there is a substantial likelihood of error in 
the eye-witness identification. Because of all the foregoing, 
the judgment and conviction of Aggravated Robbery should be 
reversed and the case remanded to the district court for a new 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The total lack of evidence that a weapon or facsimile 
of a weapon was used in the commission of the offense with 
which appellant was charged, the failure of the trial court to 
give an adequate jury instruction defining "facsimile of a 
weapon" and the refusal of the court to give an adequate 
instruction regarding the difficulties with eye-witness iden-
tification dictate that appellant's conviction for Aggravated 
Robbery should be reversed and the case should be remanded to 
the trial court for a new trial for the crime of Robbery, under 
§76-3-601, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
Dated this day of January, 1987. 
BRADLEY P. RICH 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing were mailed/delivered to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, 
on this day of January, 1987. 
ADDENDUM 
§76-6-301, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. Robbery. 
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, 
or immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by means 
of force or fear. 
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
§76-6-302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. Aggravated 
Robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course 
of committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife 
or a facsimile of a knife or a deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the first degree. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be deemed 
to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in 
an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
